UNITES STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DENNIS DIMON,)
Plaintiff,)
VS.) CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-11073 NG
)
METROPOLITAN LIFE	
INSURANCE COMPANY and KEMPER)
INSURANCE COMPANY,)
)
Defendants.)
	_)

PLAINTIFF, DENNIS DIMON, AND DEFENDANT, KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY'S, JOINT OPPOSITION TO METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMAPANY'S MOTION IN LIMINE (DOCUMENT 136) REGARDING THE DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS QUOTATION

Dimon and Kemper Insurance Company ("Kemper") jointly oppose Metropolitan Life Insurance Company's ("MetLife") Motions in Limine, <u>Document No. 136</u> seeking to exclude the "Dean Witter Reynolds Quotation" <u>and Documents No. 135, 137, and 139</u>. The parties offer the following in support of their opposition:

BRIEF INTRODUCTION

As argued *infra*, the Charter Security Life Proposal ("Proposal") satisfies the Best Evidence Rule, the test for authenticity, and is exempt from the hearsay rule.

Therefore:

- 1. the Proposal should be admitted into evidence; and
- 2. the Defendant's Motion in Limine should be denied.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On April 8, 1983, Charter Life presented the Proposal to Mr. Dimon's lawyers (through broker Dean Witter) for a "life annuity 20-year certain under a structured annuity settlement of \$1,450.45 per month for the first year and it would increase 3% per year as follows. . ." (Document 136-2 at 2) The Proposal then sets forth the resulting monthly payments over fifty years time. *See* <u>id</u>.

Within a week of receiving the Proposal, Plaintiff's lawyers held settlement discussions with Kemper, which discussions were recounted in a memorandum dated April 18, 1983. *See* April 18, 1983 Memorandum. During these settlement discussions, Plaintiff's lawyers advised Kemper that they had secured from Charter Life a \$175,000 premium quote for an annuity that would provide the exact payments set forth in the Proposal (i.e., \$1,450.45 per month, increasing 3% annually, guaranteed for 20 years and then for life). *See* April 18, 1983 Memorandum.

On April 19, 1983, Plaintiff signed a General Release, which provided as follows: "[Plaintiff]..., in consideration of the payment of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand and No/100 (\$250,000.00) Dollars and the establishment of a fully paid annuity contract for my benefit with Charter Life Insurance Company, to pay me One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty and No/100 (\$1,450.00) Dollars per month for one year following the execution of that contract and thereafter, such monthly sum increased at the rate of three (3%) percent per year, compounded annually, to be paid to me during the term of my life, and in no event for less than twenty (20) years...." *See* General Release.

On May 3, 1983, a hearing was held before the court, during which Leonard DeCof, Esq. (who had been appointed by the court as guardian ad litem for Plaintiff), testified as to the terms of the annuity and the settlement. Mr. DeCof testified, *inter alia*, that he had reviewed the

general release, the annuity proposal, and the annuity application (among other documents) at length. *See* Hearing Transcript at 4-5. Mr. DeCof testified that the \$175,000 lump sum was being used to purchase an annuity that would make the exact payments that are set forth in the Charter Life Proposal (i.e., payments in the amount of "\$1,450.45 per month guaranteed for 20 years but which would continue for the life of the plaintiff"). Id. at 6-8.

The \$175,000 annuity premium was paid to Charter Life, and on June 17, 1983, Charter Life issued the requisite lifetime annuity ("Annuity") (Document 137-2 at 11). The Annuity provides, *inter alia*, that Charter Life will pay to Plaintiff the exact monthly payments as set forth in the Charter Life Proposal, to wit: monthly payments in the amount of "\$1,450.45 each, increasing 3% annually, commencing June 6, 1983, for a period of 240 months certain and life thereafter." <u>Id</u>. On or about June 6, 1983, Charter Life began making monthly payments to Plaintiff under the Annuity.

LAW AND ARGUMENT

Authenticity

Under Fed.R.Evid. 901, "[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims." Under Rule 901, the court's determination of authenticity is merely a preliminary evaluation, and leaves the ultimate decision on genuineness to the jury. <u>United States v. Caldwell</u>, 776 F.2d 989, 1002-3 (11th Cir. 1985).

Clearly, there is no authenticity issue in connection with the Proposal. Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(8) states in pertinent part that a document is authentic if it is "in such condition as to create no suspicion concerning its authenticity, was in a place where it, if authentic, would likely

be, and which has been in existence twenty years or more at the time it is offered." Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(8). The Proposal is dated April 8, 1983, and is therefore more than 20 years old. Indeed, Mr. Dimon has testified that he personally received the Proposal from his attorney 25 years ago, has kept it in his personal files ever since – and has relied upon its contents. See Dimon's Deposition at 89-90, 157-159, Exhibit A, Mrs. Dimon's Deposition at 42, 86-88, Exhibit B, and Latti's deposition at 71 (Document 58-3 at 13).

It should be further emphasized that MetLife's argument that Charter Life did not issue the annuity proposal is extraordinarily far-fetched; the circumstantial evidence that Charter Life issued the proposal is overwhelming. For example, to accept MetLife's argument that Charter Life had nothing to do with the proposal, one would have to accept all of the following:

- Most significantly, MetLife would have the finder of fact believe that Charter Life had nothing to do with the proposal, despite the fact that the proposal mirrors exactly - (i.e., exact amounts to the penny, exact percentage increases, exact number of years certain and for life) - the terms of the Annuity that Charter Life actually issued two months later. This strains all credulity.
- That the proposal although allegedly made by an entirely different company coincidentally was made through the same broker and sent to the same plaintiff's attorney as were involved with the actual Annuity issued by Charter Life two months later.
- That an entirely different company coincidentally made a proposal for an annuity that has exactly the same terms (i.e., exact amounts to the penny, exact percentage increases, exact number of years certain and for life) as the annuity proposal that Mr. Dimon's lawyers told Kemper that Charter Life made, and that not only Dean Witter, but also the

drafters of the General Release and the Guardian ad Litem, all somehow conspired to ascribe the annuity proposal to Charter Life.

Where "identification of physical evidence and its connection to a particular defendant may be shown through either circumstantial or testimonial evidence," the circumstantial evidence offered here is simply overwhelming. *See* <u>U.S. v. Brewer</u>, 630 F.2d 795, 802 (10th Cir. 1980); *see also* <u>Caldwell</u>, *supra*, 426 F.2d at 1003 (circumstantial evidence, such as date of execution and consistency with contemporaneous documents, more than sufficiently demonstrate authenticity).

MetLife makes much of the fact that the Proposal refers to "Charter Security Life Insurance Company of New Jersey", instead of "Charter Security Life Insurance Company of New York." However, this distinction is immaterial for at least two reasons:

- First, the law is clear that "[w]hether the contents of the document correctly identify the defendant goes to its weight and is a matter for the trier of fact; it is not relevant to the threshold determination of its admissibility." <u>U.S. v. Kairys</u>, 782 F.2d 1374, 1379 (7th Cir. 1986) *citing to* <u>U.S. v. Koziy</u>, 728 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984); *see also* <u>U.S. v.</u> Demjanjuk, 367 F.3d 623, 631 (6th Cir. 2004).
- Second, and in any event, MetLife has admitted that "MetLife is responsible legally for anything that Charter might have done or didn't do in this case," and therefore cannot now argue that MetLife is not responsible for the alleged actions of a separate subsidiary of the same corporation that it bought in its entirety in 1985. See Admission of James J. Ciapciak made during the Rule 30(b)(6) Deposition of MetLife at 20, Exhibit C. Because Mr. Ciapciak, as counsel for MetLife, is "one authorized to make a statement on the

subject," and because Dimon is "offering the statement against the party that made it," this is an admission of a party opponent pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2). MetLife cannot now "pass the buck" to a subsidiary that was subsumed in *their* purchase of the Charter Security Life Insurance Companies.

Hearsay

The authentication requirements for ancient documents are precisely the same as the requirements for proving they are excepted from the hearsay rule. Therefore, a document authenticated as an ancient document under Rule 901(b)(8) is also automatically excepted from the hearsay rule. *See*, e.g. Martha Graham Sch. And Dance Found., Inc. v. Martha Graham Ctr. of Contemporary Dance, Inc., 380 F.3d 624, 643 (2d Cir. 2004) (two letters accepted as ancient documents and ruled to be excepted from the hearsay rule). "When a document is shown to have been in existence for 20 years or more and has been properly authenticated, Rule 803(16) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements contained in the document. Fed.R.Evid. 803(16). The exception is based on the assumption that the age of the ancient document justifies its admission as an exception to the hearsay rule. *See* Moore's Federal Rules Pamphlet, Part 2: Federal Rules of Evidence, § 803.6[16], 822 (2008) *citing to e.g.*, Compton v. Davis Oil Co., 607 F.Supp. 1221, 1228 (D.Wyo. 1985) *see also* Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 928 F.2d 1366, 1375 (3rd Cir. 1991), George v. Celotex Corp., 914 F.2d 26, 30 (2d Cir. 1990), *and* U.S. v. Osyp Firishchak, 468 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 2006).

In addition, the actual statements of Charter Life within the Proposal constitute admissions by party-opponent MetLife under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). Also, such statements are non-

hearsay under Rule 801(c) because, as a proposal, it is an "out-of-court statement offered as evidence of legally operative verbal conduct." See Note to Rule 801(c).

The Best Evidence Rule

In the past 25 years people with knowledge have died, pertinent documents have been lost or destroyed in the "9/11" tragedy, and therefore, the best evidence available is the duplicate of the proposal that Dimon has maintained during that same span of time in his possession. Because the authenticity of the duplicate Proposal is not in question (argued *supra*) and because admission of the duplicate is not unfair, the Proposal is admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 1003.

CONCLUSION

As argued *supra*, the Proposal satisfies the Best Evidence Rule, the test for authenticity, and is exempt from the hearsay rule.

Therefore:

- 1. the Proposal should be admitted into evidence; and
- 2. the Defendant's Motion in Limine should be denied.

WHEREFORE, Dennis Dimon respectfully requests that this Court deny MetLife's Motion in Limine seeking to exclude the annuity quotation.

Respectfully submitted, Dennis Dimon, By his attorneys,

/s/Brian Keane

DAVID B. KAPLAN, B.B.O. No. 258540 BRIAN KEANE, B.B.O. No. 656717 THE KAPLAN/BOND GROUP 88 Black Falcon Avenue, Suite 301 Boston, MA 02210 (617) 261-0080

/s/ Timothy O'Driscoll

Timothy O'Driscoll, Esq. Drinker, Biddle and Reath, LLP One Logan Square 18th and Cherry Streets Philladelphia, PA 19103 (215) 988-2700

Dated: May 13, 2008

I hereby certify that a true copy of the above document was served upon each attorney of record by ECF on May 13, 2008.

/s/Brian Keane_

1

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PAGES: 1 through 172 EXHIBITS: See Index

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

Civil Action No. 05-11073 WGY

DEPOSITION OF DENNIS J. DIMON, a witness called on behalf of the Defendant, taken pursuant to the Provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before Julie A. Healey, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Registered Professional Reporter, and Notary Public in and for the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, at the offices of Ciapciak & Associates, P.C., 99 Access Road, Norwood, Massachusetts, on June 29, 2006, commencing at 11:25 a.m.

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101 Tremont Street
Boston, Massachusetts 02108

89 1 wife's writing if you saw it? 2 Not right offhand, no, but I know some of 3 it, and the letters in there, I know she don't write like that. 4 5 Okay, and referring to the third page of 6 Exhibit 15, there's some handwriting next to the 7 numbers on the bottom, do you see where that 8 handwriting is? 9 Α. The numbers that's been wrote out? 10 Yes. 0. 11 Α. Yeah. 12 Ο. Do you know who wrote those out? 13 Α. No. 14 Okay. Where did you get this document? Q. 15 Α. From Latti, from Mr. Latti. 16 Q. Okay. When you got this document, is 17 this the actual document you got from Mr. Latti or 18 is it a copy of that document? 19 Α. It's a copy. 20 How was the document you got from 21 Mr. Latti different than this? 22 Α. There wasn't any difference. 23 0. It had all the same writings?

All except for this stamp (indicating),

24

Α.

90 1 I'm not sure what that stamp was there for, so, 2 that stamp wasn't there and the writing up in the 3 corner there, you know, Carolyn Latti, that wasn't 4 It was just basic numbers and what it said on the form itself. 5 Were these numbers written in the lower 6 right-hand corner? 8 Yeah, those were there, yeah. 9 Q. Okay. MS. McQUAY: For the record, could 10 11 you identify the stamp that he's referring to on 12 the document? 13 MR. LeBLANC: Yes, for the record, I'll identify the stamp that is mostly illegible, 14 15 I believe it says it may be a certification as to 16 the correctness of the copy with it signed and 17 then what looks like the letter D. 18 MS. McQUAY: And for the record, that 19 is the stamp that he testified was not there when 20 he got the document? 21 MR. LeBLANC: That's my 22 understanding. 23 THE WITNESS: Correct. 24

157 1 Okay. Well, you testified earlier that 2 5, 6, 7, and 9, that you do not recall receiving 3 any of those at the time. 4 Α. Right: 5 Is that correct? 6 Α. That's correct. 7 0. Do you have any reason to believe that 8 you did not receive them? 9 Α. No. 10 Where were you living at the time, during 11 this time period, the summer through the fall of 12 1983? 13 Α. In Greenwood Drive. 14 And that was your mailing address as 15 well? 16 Yes, it was. Α. 17 And I'm sorry, was that West Kingston? Ο. 18 Α. No, that was in Peacedale. 19 MR. DeWICK: Just give me a moment. 20 BY MR. DeWICK: 21 Mr. Dimon, you testified earlier you 22 received this document, and I'm referring to page 23 3 of Exhibit 15, you received this document minus 24 the stamp from Mr. Latti is your recollection?

158 1 Α. From himself, yes. 2 And do you remember when you received 3 that from him? The day that we signed the contract for 4 Α. 5 this policy. 6 And have we seen the contract for this 7 policy? 8 Α. No. 9 And did you receive a copy of that signed 10 contract? 11 Α. Nothing. 12 Do you know --13 This (indicating) is the only paper I Α. 14 received at that time. 15 Do you know where the signed copy of the 16 annuity went after you signed it? 17 Α. No. 18 Ο. Who else was in the room when you signed 19 it? 20 My wife, and I'm not sure if one of his 21 associates was there too, I'm not sure. 22 So, your wife, yourself, Mr. Latti? Ο. 23 Α. Right. 24 Q. And perhaps one of his associates?

159 1 Α. I think so. 2 0. Anyone else? 3 Α. No, not that I know of. 4 0. And do you recall, you don't recall the 5 date that that was signed, do you? 6 No, not right off. 7 But you recall it was the same day that 8 he showed you page 3 --9 Yeah. Α. 10 -- let me finish, it's hard for her, it's 11 impossible for her to write both of us at the same 12 time, actually. 13 Α. Sorry. 14 Not hard, impossible. You signed the 15 annuity the same day you received page 3 of 16 Exhibit 5, the proposal from Mr. Latti; is that 17 correct? 18 Α. Right. 19 And do you know whether that 20 was -- strike that. 21 Do you recall how long before you began 22 to receive payments that you signed the annuity 23 contract, how much time elapsed between the

signing and receiving your first payment?

24

COPY

VOLUME: 1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

DEPOSITION of KATHERINE DIMON, a Witness called by and on behalf of the Defendants, taken pursuant to the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, before Vincent Martino, a Notary Public within and for the Comm. Of Massachusetts, held at the Law Offices of Ciapciak & Associates, PC, 99 Access Road, Norwood, MA 02062 on Monday, August 7, 2006, commencing at 11:30 a.m.

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101 Tremont Street
Boston, Masssachusetts 02108
(617) 423-5841

In handwriting? 1 Q. 2 Α. Yes. Do you know what those numbers represent? 3 Q. I think it is supposed to be how much you collect a 4 Α. year. I'm not sure. 5 Okay. Do you know if that stamp that is difficult 6 Ο. 7 to read right on top, do you know what that signature is or whose signature that is? 8 No. 9 Α. 10 Ο. Does that look like a D to you? 11 Α. Yes, it does. 12 Ο. Could that be Mr. Dimon's signature? It doesn't look like his D. 13 Do you know if he received this document, Page 3 of 14 Exhibit 10, do you recall if you received that in 1983 or 15 more recently? 16 In 1983. 1.7 Α. Do you know if you received this before or after 18 19 the settlement? I think after. 20 Α. And where were you when you received this? 21 Ο. I don't recall. 22 Do you know if you were in Boston for a meeting 23 Q. with Mr. Latti or someplace else? 24 Α. I would say Boston. 25

1	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. DEWICK:
2	Q. If you could go to Exhibit 10, Ms. Dimon. I think
3	it is Exhibit 10. The four page Exhibit.
4	A. Okay.
5	Q. Are you there?
6	A. Yes.
7	Q. Could you look at the second page for me.
8	A. Okay.
9	Q. Make it the third page. I believe you testified
10	earlier that you received that from Mr. Latti and then you
11	later testified that you think you received that from Mr.
12	Latti?
13	A. Yes.
14	Q. Was that your testimony today?
15	A. Yes.
16	Q. Do you actually recall receiving this from Mr.
17	Latti?
18	A. I was there but like I said I don't know which
19	lawyer presented it.
20	Q. You recall a lawyer in Mr. Latti's office giving
21	you this specific document?
22	A. Yes.
23	Q. You don't recall which lawyer that was?
24	A. No.
25	Q. Do you recall where this took place?

It had to have been in Boston. 1 Α. 2 Q. But you don't remember? 3 Α. No. Q. Do you remember when it happened? 5 It was after the case was all over. Α. 6 After the trial? Ο. 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q. After the trial was over? 9 Α. Yes. After the settlement had been reached? 10 Q. 11 Α. Yes. Do you recall being in Court in Rhode Island? 12 Ο. Α. Yes. 13 With your husband? Q. 14 15 A. Yes. 16 In which your settlement was discussed or your Q. 17 husband's settlement was discussed in front of a Judge, do you recall that? 18 19 Α. Yes. Do you recall if you received this document after 20 21 that or before that hearing? 22 Α. After. 23 If you could just turn to the next page, please. Q. 24 Α. Okay. I believe you testified earlier this information 25 Q.

here at the bottom, we had the understand -- I believe that 1 is supposed to be understanding -- that my wife was to 2 collect this check up to twenty years if anything happened 3 to me and I was to collect for fifty years. 4 I believe you testified earlier that information 5 came from Mr. Latti? 6 7 His office, yes. Α. Do you recall the conversation in which that 8 Q. information was given to you? 9 10 Α. No. Do you recall when that conversation took place? 11 Q. I know we received all this stuff after the Court 12 Α. 13 hearing. When you say this stuff, what do you mean exactly? 14 0. What do you call it, the Charter Life Insurance 15 Α. Company papers in here. 16 Are you telling me that when you said you received 17 Q. this information contained in Page 4 of Exhibit 10 from Mr. 18 Latti, you are referring to -- you gleaned this information 19 from the previous page, Page 3? 20 MS. MCQUAY: Objection as to form. 21 THE WITNESS: I'm a little confused. 22 MR. DEWICK: That was an awful question. You should 23 have been confused. 24 Did you receive this information on Page 4 in a

25

Ο.

1	CERTIFIED COPY	1
2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT	
2	DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS	
3	DISTRICT OF TRISOROUGHTS	
4	DENNIS DIMON,	
4	Plaintiff,	
5	-against-	
6	MET LIFE INSURANCE CO., KEMPER INSURANCE	
Ü	CO., MORGAN STANLEY D.W., INC., MICHAEL B.	
7	LATTI, LATTI ASSOCIATES and LATTI &	
·	ANDERSON, LLP	
8	Defendants.	
9	X	
10	May 10, 2006	
	10:00 a.m.	
11		
12		
13		
14	Deposition of Met Life Insurance Co.	
15	by Barbara Fasman, 30(b)(6) witness, held at	
16	the offices of Met Life, One Met life Plaza,	
17	27-01 Queens Plaza North, Long Island City,	
18	New York, before Vicky Galitsis, a Certified	
19	Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the	
20	State of New York.	
21		
22		
23		
24	GREENHOUSE REPORTING, INC.	
۷4	363 Seventh Avenue - 20th Floor	
25	New York, New York 10001	
	1 (212) 279-5108	

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1
                        B. Fasman
2
    Charter Security was acquired by or in some
3
    other fashion became a part of Met Life?
 4
                   MR. CIAPCIAK: Sue, perhaps I can
5
           get to the point here.
 6
                   MS. McQUAY:
                               Sure.
                   MR. CIAPCIAK: If you're asking
7
           whether Met Life is responsible legally
8
           for anything that Charter might have
9
           done or didn't do in this case, Met
10
11
           Life is responsible.
12
                   MS. McQUAY: I won't belabor the
13
           issue then.
                   MR. CIAPCIAK: Great.
14
15
           Ο.
                  Ms. Fasman, directing your
16
    attention to Exhibit 1, at the top of the
17
    document there appears a number 83A08153, do
18
    you see that?
19
           Α.
                  Yes.
20
           Q.
                   To what does that refer?
21
           Α.
                   To my understanding that refers
22
    to the number of the annuity that Charter
    sold, the contract number.
23
24
           Q.
                   Okay. How did you derive that
25
    understanding?
```